Chapter One: Introduction
The recent outbreaks of civil wars and conflicts in Niger (2007), Guinea Bissau (2008-2009), Côte d’Ivoire (2011), Sudan (2009-2014), etc., have received little or no pro-active peace support operations from Nigeria. This is in sharp contrast to the past active engagement of Nigeria in the sub-region. The aggressive articulation of African-centeredness in Nigeria’s foreign policy under General Murtala Mohammed (1975-1976) made the colonial and apartheid regimes in South Africa to reduce or stop their activities. At a point, Murtala challenged the United States of America and South Africa when they planned to install a puppet regime in Angola (Nigerian Army, 2011). General Obasanjo equally employed cultural diplomacy to assert the supremacy of Nigeria in the region by hosting high level international conferences like the World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC 77’), the World Conference for Action against Apartheid and ECOWAS Heads of State Summit, etc. The government also applied militancy in its foreign policy by ‘nationalizing’ British assets in Nigeria such as the British Petroleum in retaliation to Britain’s decision to sell crude oil to South Africa. This action, coupled with leading other African countries to boycott the 1978 Montreal Olympics forced the British government under Thatcher to reverse its proposed recognition of and support for the minority racist government in Zimbabwe (Obioma ,1986).
Despite the efforts of the Nigerian people to pursue African agenda in its foreign policy, the country has witnessed series of bitterness from its African neighbours. In South Africa, it is perceived that Nigerian migrants are the most uncooperative community in South Africa. There is a general perception that Nigerians are involved in illegal activities such as drug dealing, human trafficking and money laundering. In addition they are accused of being involved in criminal syndicates such as cell phone and car theft, duplicating credit cards and money laundering. It is also difficult to police and monitor their businesses because they threaten the weak police with fire arms. Nigerians are also known for bribing corrupt police and lawyers to clear their names or making their criminal dockets disappear (Chidozie, 2014).
In March 2012, South Africa sent about 125 Nigerians away and claimed that they were in possession of fake yellow fever vaccine cards. Nigeria, in retaliation, turned away 131 South Africans. It must be noted however that the origin of this goes beyond vaccination. South Africans see Nigerians as 419 people, drug pushers and human traffickers. Many Nigerians have been reported to have fake marriages with South African women, duped them and sometimes use them for prostitution. All these have made Nigerians to become the ATM (automated teller machine) for South African policemen. Hence, if the South African government needs a scapegoat to blame for high crime rate, Nigerians were the easy target. Nigeria however retaliated. This mode of reciprocity is the concern of this study.
Chapter Two: Literature Review
Focuses on the literature review which unearths the foundations of Nigeria-South Africa relations; and contextualizes the position of the two countries in the study.
Chapter Three: Trajectory of Nigeria-South Africa relations
Looks at the trajectory of Nigeria-South Africa relations with emphasis on commerce and industry; information and communication technology, and multilateral politics.
Chapter Four: Nature and Dynamics of Nigeria-South Africa relations
Examines the nature and dynamics of Nigeria-South Africa relations from year 1999 up to 2015. It also looks at the irritants in Nigeria-South Africa relations as well as the patterns of reciprocity in their bilateral relations.
Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations
Summary and conclusions are to be drawn from the research literature, research findings and content analysis.